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HB M

10 March, 1952

Psychological Warfare: The term Psychological Warfare has been read too often with emphasis on the first word. It is warfare. The end of warfare is to impose one's will upon the enemy. The objective of the war we fight is to cause the Communist authority to act in accordance with our wishes.

Hot War and Cold War: These terms are misleading. If this is a cold war, is Korea hot, and if Korea is hot, must we continue cold war operations in Korea though it be hot? There are two elements in warfare, one, overt armed conflict, and the other, a non-combat warfare which goes on irrespective of whether or not armed conflict is proceeding simultaneously. The essential continuity and integration of our activities is difficult to explain, define and intelligently plan if we are hampered by terminology which implies that one kind of war stops when another begins.

U. S. Vulnerability: "Psychological conditions of advantage to the Soviet position" seems a long way to say U. S. vulnerability, and some people might not understand it.

Our principle vulnerability lies in the unwillingness of citizens of the U. S. to assume responsibility for their own personal welfare and the pursuit of security at the sacrifice of freedom. These make us vulnerable to counterattack in any attempt at ideological conquest of the world. It is difficult to convince others of the importance of the freedom which we ourselves pusillanimously cast aside.

Advantage to the Enemy: Our present activities in non-combat warfare violate basic principles of A-RDP80-01065A000100170038-8

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coordinated in responsibility, policy, planning or implementation; that they neglect the development and use of valuable weapons, and by all these deficiencies lack total effective impact.

Enemy Capabilities: Russian capabilities of impeding the implementation of NCW plans consist almost entirely in security measures. These vary from almost complete effectiveness within the USSR to quite ineffective in some of the slave states.

Plans: There is a basic principle in warfare that a poor plan is better than no plan. In order for us to prevail it is essential that we make and implement a plan employing all instruments of national policy in a coordinated continuing effort. This requirement implies unity of command so that one agency will not unilaterally depart from an agreed course of action.

Authority and Discipline: These latter considerations are as much needed within this organization as between organizations. The principle of personal responsibility must be enforced, and he who can not produce must be replaced by one who can.

Projects: The project system must be replaced by approved plans and authority of each echelon to operate within the plan on its own initiative. This principle conforms to military practice and is inevitable if we are to win the war.

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Deception: Deception undertakes to cause the enemy to take the action which he believes to be right but which is, in fact, in accordance with our plans.

NCW has little recourse to force. The force necessary to conquer the Communist authority must therefore be the enemy's own force. To employ the enemy's force against itself is the business of deception.

Deception employs all instrumentalities of government. It is known for what it is only by the planners. Those who execute its operations do not know their basic purpose.

The effectiveness of the Communist espionage network throughout the world and the relative impenetrability of the Iron Curtain constitute great advantages to U. S. deception activities.

There are fewer than one-half dozen civilians and hardly a score of military personnel who have the experience and training necessary to do top-level planning in this field. It takes three years to make a deception planner after he has had experience in global or inter-theater planning.

Exploitation of deception requires the designation of the appropriate mechanisms for determining deception policy planning and execution of deception operations and the utilization of certain deception channels. The Senior Staff of the NSC in conjunction with the PSB should establish appropriate policy. The Central Intelligence Agency, because of the mission assigned by NSC 10/2, should have primary responsibility for the planning and direction of strategic deception operations, but in coordination with the JCS.

PW: To exploit the PW potential fully, it is necessary to mobilize and employ the total mass-communication system of the free world. This system has its value in that it is free. Its employment must, therefore, not violate that principle. The PW Branch in OPC has undertaken to mobilize the free world's mass-communication facilities through the



The PW Branch in OPC can, through its staff or consultants, furnish support in any PW field wherever the need exceeds local capabilities, i. e. special task forces to exploit events for PW purposes, etc.

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
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